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Abstract
This paper provides a unified analysis for the onset of the 1998 financial crisis and
the strong economic recovery afterward in Russia and other former Soviet Union
countries. Before the crisis a banking failure arose owing to the coexistence of a
lemons credit market and high government borrowing. In a lemons credit mar-
ket low credit risk firms switched from bank to nonbank finance, including trade
credits and barter trade, generating an externality on banks’ interest rates. The
collapse of the treasury bills market in the financial crisis triggered a change in
banks’ lending behavior, providing initial conditions for banking development.
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I. INTRODUCTION
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet
Union countries took a bumpy road in their transition to a market economy. The real
sectors of these economies experienced a sharp contraction in 1998, output was only
around 50 percent of its 1989 level (see Table 1). During the period of 1989 to 1998,
the real sector had accumulated a huge amount of outstanding debt and arrears and
noncash payments had become a dominant feature of these economies. Taking Russia
as an example, total payables to the enterprise sector exploded from around 20 percent
of GDP in 1994 to over 70 percent of GDP in 1998, while total receivables rose from 20
percent of GDP to about 45 percent of GDP over the same period. Associated with
these phenomena, noncash payments and barter started to rise from 8 percent in 1994,
when inflation was under control, to more than 50 percent of sales in 1998 (see Figure
A1).
CIS1 Central Europe
Russia Poland
Ukraine Czech Republic
Azerbaijan Hungary
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Source: International Monetary Fund
1 CIS denotes Commonwealth of Independent Sates
Table 1. Real GDP in Selected Transition Countries, 1998
Relative to 1989
78
61
95
117
54
55
37
44
93
95
(1989 = 100)
In contrast to the contraction of the real sector, the number of commercial
banks in these economies increased rapidly. In Russia, the number of commercial banks
increased from fewer than 100 in 1988 to about 2,400 in 1994 and 2,500 in 1998.3 Many
3 Although the number of banks has increased dramatically, the Russian banking sector is still quite
concentrated. In 1997, the top five banks accounted for 36 percent, and the top 50 banks for 71
percent, of total assets. About three-quarters of all household deposits were maintained with Sberbank.
- 4 -
of those banks are owned by large firms. Despite the boom in the number of banks and
their cross holdings in the real sector, banks failed to lend to firms, and banks’ credit
to the real sector declined substantially in these economies. For example, in real terms,
Russian bank credits to the real sector declined by almost 60 percent, while the ruble
loan interest rates were very high (Table 2).4
total loans foreigncurrency ruble loans interest rates
1) inflation2)
1996 247 117 130 146.8 47.7
1997 310 130 180 32.0 14.7
1998 422 298 123 41.8 27.7
1999 597 304 293 39.7 85.7
2000 956 368 588 24.4 20.8
2001 1418 474 944 17.9 21.5
Source: International Monetary Fund, Central Bank of Russia
1)commercial banks´ 3-months lending rates in percent
2)consumer price index in percent
Table 2. Bank Credit to the Real Sector
(in billions of rubles)
Why did banks refuse to lend to firms? Where did commercial banks invest
instead? Evidence shows that they concentrated their investments in treasury bills. For
example, by the end of 1997, commercial banks in Russia invested almost three-quarters
of ruble deposits in federal government securities.5 A similar picture emerges from
other FSU countries, notably Ukraine (Table 3). In fact, Russian and Ukrainian banks
are among the worst performers in transition countries in terms of mobilizing savings
and allocating credit to the private sector, and they are a key factor underlying the
surge of nonbank finance, including trade credit and barter trade, in these economies.
The irony is that even bank owners in these economies chose nonbank financing for
their manufacturing and trade, while letting banks absorb credit from these large firms
4 In nominal terms ruble loans to the real sector declined by 31.7 percent, from 180 billion rubles to
123 billion rubles, between 1997 and 1998.
5 See OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 1997, Paris, 1997-1998.
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and invest in government bonds. Both countries experienced a continued decline over
time in the scale of banking activities with respect to the real sector. After the massive
privatization, the ratio of credit to the private sector declined from 12 percent of GDP
in 1994 to 8 percent in 1997 in Russia, and from 5 percent in 1994 to 2 percent in 1997
in Ukraine. By contrast, the average ratio for all the transition countries was 22 percent
of GDP in 1994 and 23 percent in 1997.
1994 1996 1997 1999
Azerbaijan - 1 - 3
Belarus 18 7 9 10
Kazakhstan 25 6 5 9
Latvia 16 7 11 -
Lithuania 18 11 10 10
Russia 12 7 8 12
Ukraine 5 1 2 9
Czech Republic 40 57 68 44
Hungary 26 22 24 21
Poland 12 16 18 19
Table 3. Credit to the Private Sector in Transition Countries
(in percent of GDP)
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washington), various
issues
Given the poor economic performances of Russia and Ukraine, it is not surprising
that a financial crisis occurred in 1998. However, the very fast and strong recoveries in
Russia and Ukraine after the 1998 financial crisis caught many observers by surprise.
In 1999, Russia and Ukraine experienced positive growth for the first time since the fall
of the Soviet Union. The IMF, in its World Economic Outlook, adjusted its forecast of
economic growth for Russia upward several times. Russian GDP grew by 3.2 percent in
1999, 7.5 percent in 2000, and 5 percent in 2001; and 4.4 percent growth was expected
in 2002. Similarly, in Ukraine, GDP growth was 5.9 percent in 2000 and 9.1 percent
in 2001; and the economy was expected to grow by 5.0 in 2002 (see Figure A3). Total
arrears and barter have started to decline in Russia. In particular, barter and noncash
payments dropped by 20 percent in 1999 and continued to decline in 2000 and 2001
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(see Figure A1).6 Even more interesting is the fact that commercial banks started to
lend to the real sector after the crisis. Ruble loans to the economy more than doubled
in nominal terms between 1998 and 1999 from 123 billion rubles to 293 billion rubles.
At the same time, lending rates of commercial banks declined sharply in nominal as
well as real terms (see Table 2 and Figure A1).7 A similar picture emerges for Ukraine,
where bank credit to the private sector increased from 2 percent of GDP in 1997 to 9
percent of GDP in 1999 (see Table 3 and Figure A1).
These observations on Russia and Ukraine before and after the 1998 financial
crisis seem puzzling. First, although the number of banks increased substantially,
arrears and barter started to explode in Russia after 1994, when macroeconomic
stabilization was in place. Thus, the banks’ failure to lend to the real sector and
the noncash economy do not appear to be a consequence of hyperinflation. Second,
following the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1998 that brought down many banks,
arrears and barter started to decline. This is not what one would expect, because a
financial crisis usually causes widespread liquidity shortages and often leads to a credit
crunch, forcing firms to run up more arrears and engage in more barter transactions.
Third, immediately after the financial crisis, Russia and Ukraine started to have
substantial economic growth for the first time since the collapse of the U.S.S.R. This
stands in contrast to the experience of many other economies, for which financial crises
have led to sharp output decline.8
These puzzles raise many question. What explains the separation between
the financial and the real sectors before the crisis? What is the relationship between
the noncash economy, on the one hand, and the exuberance in financial markets, on
the other hand? How can we explain the unexpected high growth of the Russian
and Ukrainian economies after the 1998 financial crisis? Has the unexpected growth
something to do with the decline in barter trade and the increase in bank lending to the
real sector? If so, what is the function of a financial crisis in this process?
6 According to the interfax news agency the share of barter in sales dropped as well in Ukraine from
33 percent in 1999 to 17 percent in 2000, and to 8 percent in 2001. The Russian Economic Barometer
estimates that noncash payments have dropped to below 10 percent at the beginning of 2003.
7 Due to the collapse of the government treasury bills market, the large exposure of portfolios of
commercial banks to this market made many banks insolvent. This has led to a consolidation and
concentration in the banking sector with 3 state banks (of which one is Sberbank) now accounting for
about 80 percent of the assets. Moreover, Sberbank started to aggressively enter the lending market
pushing some of the existing large banks out of this market. For the restructuring of the Russian
banking sector after the crisis, see Interfax Center for Economic Analysis, Russia‘s Largest Banks in
1999, Moscow 1999.
8 Based on a sample of 195 crisis episodes across 91 developing countries, Gupta, Mishra and Sahay
(2001) find in their study on ouput responses to financial crisis that around 60 percent of the crises have
been contractionary. Moreoever, Loayza, and Ranciere (2001) find in the countries that experience a
fall in output after crisis, that it takes on average 4 years for output to recover.
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We develop a model to address the above questions. Our model assumes severe
information asymmetry in these economies, so that banks are not able to distinguish
good credit risk firms from bad ones. Thus, banks charge high interest rates on loans
to all borrowing firms. This, in turn, induces good-quality firms to turn to nonbank
finance, such as trade credits and barter trade, which involves less of information
asymmetry but are more costly.9 The option for good firms to raise liquidity through
nonbank finance drives up bank lending interest rates further, since banks expect that
only lower-quality firms will borrow. In equilibrium, then only low-quality firms borrow
from banks while good-quality firms turn to nonbank finance, and the banking sector
looks for high-yield government securities in which to invest. We call this a banking
trap, in the sense that the financial sector is separated from the real sector of the
economy. This separation hinders banking sector development and economic growth,
although on the surface there is financial exuberance, particularly in the government
securities market. Using data from a survey among firms in Ukraine in 1997, our
empirical evidence suggests that bank loans were mainly allocated to firms of low
quality.
Our theory thus highlights the role of the financial sector before and after the
crisis.10 It suggests a link between the government’s budget deficit and the noncash
economy which has been overlooked so far. In our model, the government’s public
debt and the size of the noncash economy are simultaneously determined. It is
frequently argued that arrears and barter in Russia and Ukraine are driven by tax
motives. By allowing firms to hide some of their profits, thereby lowering their taxable
income, nonbank finance is seen to contribute to the difficulty of raising taxes and
thus causing the government’s budget to explode. Our theory suggests, in addition,
that the government’s budget deficit is crowding out bank lending to the real sector
by creating an environment in which banks invest in the treasury bills market, which
9 In our model, we take the existence of non-bank finance for firms as given and focus on the banking
failure. In a recent paper Marin and Schnitzer (2003) argue that barter is a response to a banking
failure. Barter is a trade credit between firms which is repaid in goods rather than cash. Marin and
Schnitzer take the banking failure as given and argue that barter offers a deal-specific collateral which
effectively lowers credit enforcement costs.
10 For insightful discussions of the role of the financial sector in economic transition, see Berglof and
Bolton (2002).
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offers exceptionally high returns, and the real sector turns to nonbank finance to meet
its liquidity needs.11 12
Our theory also offers an explanation of why the 1998 crisis has had some
beneficial effects for the economies of Russia and Ukraine. Our explanation links the
puzzling facts that following the crisis of 1998 the noncash economy started to decline
in Russia and Ukraine, the banking sector started to lend to the real sector and loan
interest rates declined sharply. When the Russian government defaulted on its bonds
in August 1998, the securities market collapsed. Although many banks with large
holdings of government securities collapsed, the economy turned around, moving from
negative growth to positive growth. We argue that the vanished market for government
bonds induced the surviving banks to reallocate their assets to the real sector at lower
interest rates to attract borrowers. Lower loan interest rates, in turn, made it attractive
for some better-quality firms to start borrowing from banks rather than to continuing
to use nonbank finance. This improved the average creditworthiness of the pool of
borrowers and, in turn, further lowered interest rates and induced more firms to switch
from barter trade to bank loans. The strong economic recovery naturally followed,
and also provided an opportunity for the banking sector to further develop.13 Based
on data for 20 transition countries, we test the prediction that the financial crisis was
a trigger for more rapid long-run economic growth and banking development. Our
evidence shows that before the crisis, the allocation of bank credit to the real sector of
the economy was, indeed, hampered by the government’s overissuing of bonds and by
the opportunities firms had to engage in barter trade, but after the crisis, banks started
to provide more loans to firms at low interest rates.
11 In the debate over the non-cash economy tax reasons figure prominently as an explanation. However,
empiricial evidence for Russia and Ukraine suggests that tax motives have only minor importance,
while the lack of liquidity and high borrowing costs for bank loans are the prime motivation for firms
to engage in barter trade, see Commander and Mumssen (1999) for evidence in Russia, and Marin,
Kaufmann, Gorochowskij (2000) for evidence in Ukraine.
12 According to Shleifer and Treisman (2000) this was the price Russia had to pay to achieve
stabilization of inflation. Rather than printing money to finance the budget, the government issued
treasury bills and maintained artificially high interest rates on these bills to co-opt the banks who
havily invested in this market. Yields on the GKO market reached up to 60 percent (see Figure 1).
13 During the crisis the ruble depreciated by more then fifty percent (see Figure A3) which may be an
alternative explanation for why barter dropped after the August crisis in Russia. However, Ukraine had
only a mild depreciation of the exchange rate but also experienced a sharp drop in barter and arrears
after 1998. This suggests that some other force is at work here. Similar arguments also apply to oil
prices after 1998 given Russia is an oil exporter while Ukraine is an oil importer. Another alternative
argument that the return to the cash economy in Russia is due to a reversal in capital flight after the
August crisis does not seem to be supported by the data. Westin (2000) and Loungani and Mauro
(2000) argue that capital flight picked up again in Russia after the tightening of capital controls in the
aftermath of the crisis.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we develop a model
of the bank-firm relationship in a “lemons market” a la` Akerlof (1970). In Section III,
we characterize the equilibrium of the lemons market in which the financial and the
real sectors are separated. Section IV describes how the financial crisis has helped
the economies of the CIS countries and the Baltics to get out of the banking trap. In
Section V, we test the predictions of the model with firm-level data from Ukraine and
with country-level data for 20 transition economies. Section VI concludes. All proofs
are provided in Appendix II.
II. Model
We consider an economy with M banks and N firms, where N > M ; and the
government.
Firms: Firm i0s (i = 1, ..., N) quality, measured as its probability of being solvent,
λi, is only known to itself. The quality of firms can be ranked as λ1 > λ2 > ... > λN .
But the ranking of firms is not known to any particular bank and firm in the market.
The average quality of all firms is λN = 1N
PN
i=1 λi, which is known to all the firms and
banks. The liquidity demand of firms can be met through borrowing from banks or
through other means, such as borrowing from other firms in the form of trade credits
in cash or in the form of trade credits in goods (barter trade)14. We will call these
alternative forms of finance as nonbank-financing (NBF). To meet their liquidity needs
profit maximizing firms choose the cheaper way between bank financing and NBF.
To simplify the analysis we assume that NBF cost b is constant.15 NBF cost b is
a reduced form capturing many possible interpretations.16
14 Overdue trade credits in cash (firm arrears) and trade credits in goods (barter) exploded in Russia
and other FSU economies. Usually goods used in barter are not fixed assets and heterogeneous in
quality. This means that these goods are typically not collaterizable assets for bank loans due to high
cost of quality assessment or selling for banks. For barter as a collateralized trade credit, see Marin
and Schnitzer (2002).
15 This assumption can easily be relaxed without changing the qualitative results. For example, one
could make b to depend on firm characteristics like the firm’s level of quality. However, as will become
clear later this complication would reinforce the separation result we will derive in the next section
without adding insight.
16 In addition to solving liquidity problems, it is argued that NBF may cut costs since it may reduce
hold-up or disorganization problems (Marin and Schnitzer, 2003); may help firms in tax evasion (for
empirical evidence, see Commander and Mumssen,1999; and Marin, Kaufmann, Gorochowskij, 2000).
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Government: We suppose that the government’s total revenue equals its tax
revenue plus its borrowing and NBF firms evade taxes.17 Given the possibility for tax
evasion, the government is assumed not to be able to collect taxes effectively. For any
given government revenue, R, the lower the tax revenue, T , the more the government
issues bonds to finance its expenditures B = R− T .
When there are n NBF firms the tax revenue is reduced to T = (N − n) t, where
t is the tax paid by each firm. To borrow more, the yield of government bond, s, has
to be higher.18 To capture this idea in a simple way, we assume that the yields of
government bonds, s, is a positive linear function of the amount of borrowing. When
there is no tax evasion the interest rate of government securities reaches its lower bound
with s = φr0, where φ is the investors’ relative confidence in government securities.
When the relative confidence in government securities is the same as that of investing
in the private sector, then φ = 1; otherwise it is φ > 1. To make things simple, we treat
φ as a reduced form and take φ and t as exogenously given.19
To summarize, we have the government security yield equation, which is a
function of the number of NBF firms in the economy,
s (n) = rφB (n)
B¯
= rφR − (N − n) t
R−Nt
where, B¯ is planned government borrowing; and B (n) is realized government borrowing.
Bank-firm relationship: We assume free entry in the banking sector. Facing
competition, each bank makes its investment decision based on expected returns. If
the expected return of investing in government securities is higher than that of lending
to a firm, banks will invest in government securities rather than lend to firms; and
vice-versa.
We suppose that there is asymmetric information between banks and firms
such that banks are not able to identify which firm is of good quality and which is of
bad quality. Asymmetric information between banks and firms is a severe problem in
transition economies. Most banks in transition economies are new and have very little
experience with credit evaluation. Furthermore, the lack of accounting standards and
17 Although in our model NBF is driven by financial considerations, NBF offers better opportunities
for firms to evade taxes. This is confirmed well with the empirical evidence for Russia and other FSU
countries (see Commander and Mumssen, 1999; and Marin, Kaufmann, Gorochowskij, 2000).
18 The government can either issue government bond domestically with a high yield; or borrow from
foreign investors by issuing dollar denominated bonds and paying higher interest rates.
19 Alternatively, φ may also be interpreted as a risk premium on government securities.
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market valuation of firms’ assets makes it difficult to evaluate firms’ creditworthiness.
The only information that banks are assumed to have is the average quality of the firms
in the economy, λN . Thus, banks’ ex ante belief of the probability that a firm will be
able to repay its loan is λN . Therefore, banks’ expected rate of return of lending to
firms is rN λ¯N , where rN is the rate of repayment of a solvent firm when there are in
total N firms borrowing. Comparing the expected rate of return of lending to a firm
and investing in government securities, the arbitrage condition for a bank is
(1 + rN) λ¯N = 1 + s.
Or the rate that a bank will charge to a firm will be
rN = (1 + s)/λ¯N − 1.
Facing this rate, rN , a firm i with a probability of success of λi, will face an expected
marginal cost of borrowing from the bank of
λi(1 + rN) = (1 + s)
λi
λ¯N
.
If raising liquidity through NBF is less costly than borrowing from banks, firm i will
borrow from other firms. The condition for this to happen for firm i is then
λi
λ¯N
≥ b
1 + s
.
Thus, we have,
Lemma 1 Firm i will use NBF if and only if:
λi ≥
bλ¯N
1 + s
. (1)
Notice that b
1+s
is the ratio between and the cost of raising $1 liquidity through
NBF and the yields of government bonds, which also affects the cost of raising $1
liquidity through a bank loan. From Lemma 1, obviously, a firm is more likely to use
- 12 -
NBF to solve its liquidity constraint, when the marginal cost of NBF b, is low, or the
interest rate charged by banks, s, is high. Moreover, the higher is the quality of a firm,
λi, the more likely it engages in NBF. The intuition of this result is straightforward.
With information asymmetry between banks and firms, banks charge an interest rate
according to the market average quality. As a result the high quality borrowers subsidize
the low quality borrowers in the pool of different quality borrowers. Turning to NBF
helps this high quality firms to escape to subsidize the low quality firms.
III. Separation of the Financial and the Real Sector
In the previous section, we have shown that in a lemons lending market good
quality firms face higher borrowing costs than bad quality firms. As a result good
quality firms are more likely to use NBF to solve their liquidity problems than to
borrow from banks. Moreover, as better quality firms switch to NBF to meet their
liquidity problems, it generates an externality on the lending rates of banks, because
the average quality of the pool of borrowing firms is lowered. Consequently the lending
interest rate goes up, which in turn leads more better quality firms to turn away from
banks. This logic repeats until in equilibrium only the bad quality firms borrow from
banks and the good quality firms raise liquidity through NBF. That is, in equilibrium
the financial sector is separated from the real sector of the economy. In the following
we show this separating equilibrium formally.
First, we illustrate conditions for a separating equilibrium between the financial
and real sector when s is exogenously given. We then derive a separating equilibrium
with s being endogenized. To make things simple, we assume that λi = λi−1 − µ for all
i = 1, 2, ...,N , and λN = µ.
Associated with this assumption, for a given µ, N can be interpreted as a
measure of heterogeneity of the firms, which determines information asymmetry. When
N is large, the degree of information asymmetry between firms and banks in the
economy is high, and subscript i now can be interpreted as a label for a group of firms
that have the same quality λi. Under this assumption, the average quality of all firms is
λN =
1
N
NX
i=1
λi =
(1 +N)µ
2
.
The firms’ quality can be ranked as λ1 > λ2 > ...λn−1 > λn > ... > λN . We assume that
the ranking is not known to any agent in the economy. Let us suppose that λn satisfies
the following condition,
- 13 -
λn−1 >
bλ¯N
1 + s
> λn.
According to Lemma 1, this condition implies that firms with subscript i ≤ n − 1 will
not borrow from banks because their cost of borrowing is too high. All other firms with
i ≥ n will find it cheaper to borrow from banks. Thus, at the starting point the n− 1
high quality firms do not borrow from banks.
In the following lemma (proof in Appendix II), we show for exogenously given s
that when the bank lending market is a lemons market, in equilibrium the higher the
ratio 1+s
b
, the fewer firms will borrow from banks.
Lemma 2 There are three possible equilibria in a lemons bank lending market: 1). if
1 ≤ 1+s
b
, the equilibrium is n∗ = N and no firm borrows from banks; however; 2) if
N+2
2(N+1)
≥ 1+s
b
, the equilibrium is n∗ = 0 and all firms borrow from banks; and finally,3).
if N+2
2(N+1)
< 1+s
b
< 1, there exists an equilibrium n∗ ∈ (0, N) such that all firms with
subscript i ≤ n∗ do not borrow, while all the remaining N−n∗ firms borrow from banks.
Lemma 2 shows that in a bank lemons lending market with sufficiently high
yields of government securities s relative to the NBF costs b in equilibrium no firm will
borrow from banks and the financial sector is separated from the real sector. However,
if the ratio between the treasury bill rates and NBF costs is sufficiently low, all firms
will borrow from banks. At a moderate ratio, low quality firms only will borrow from
banks.
So far we have assumed that the yields of government bonds s is exogenously
given. However, s will depend also on the number of NBF firms in the economy. In the
following, we endogenize the yields of government bonds s to make its value depends
on the number of NBF firms in the economy. Substituting s (n) into the condition in
Lemma 1, the no-borrow condition becomes
s (n) ≥ ψ (n) (2)
with
s (n) = φr0
µ
1 +
t
R−Ntn
¶
as the government securities yields equation; and
- 14 -
ψ (n) =
b (N − n+ 2)
2 (N − n+ 1) − 1
as the banking lemons market equation. The following proposition (proof in Appendix
II)gives conditions for a separating equilibrium in which the good quality firms do not
borrow from banks.20
Proposition 1 If (b− 1)
¡
1− tN
R
¢
> φro > b(N+2)2(N+1) − 1, a unique interior equilibrium
n∗ ∈ (0, N) , s∗ ∈
¡
φro, φr0RR−Nt
¢
exists such that n∗ better quality firms do not borrow and
the remaining N − n∗ low quality firms borrow from banks. Moreover, the equilibrium
value of n∗, s∗ increase with t,φro and decrease with R.
Intuitively, when the number of NBF firms increases, the government’s tax
revenue T declines, which in turn pushes up the yields of government bonds, s. This,
in turn, may lead more firms not to borrow from banks. The switching from borrowing
to NBF will generate a negative externality on other borrowing firms who may stop
borrowing as well. As a consequence s is pushed further up which will again induce
more firms not to borrow. This cycle repeats until s is too high to attract more
borrowers; or the borrowing firms are of too poor a quality to switch to NBF.
The above result illustrates a banking trap. Banks invest in government bonds,
while firms, in particular good quality ones, solve their liquidity problems through NBF.
The economy is stuck in the banking trap which causes a separation between the real
sector and the banking sector. This separation result between the real and the banking
sector is substantially different from a conventional ‘government crowding out’ story
because information asymmetry is one of the key factors which cause the separation.
The following example illustrates that when the degree of information asymmetry
increases, the separation between the two sectors becomes stronger. In our simulation
we ‘calibrate’ the model with data from Russia in 1997 before the August financial
crisis. The total government expenditure in percent of GDP in Russia was 18.4% in
1997. Thus we choose 18% for R. Since planned tax revenue T is not observable we
assume a value of 10 for T . With respect to the value of the exogenous benchmark
lending rate r, we use an average lending rate of Czech commercial banks, which were
among the best established banks in transition economies, between 1997 (13.2%) and
1999 (8.7%), which was 10%.
20 The result shows only the case that is most relevant to our evidence. A full characterization of the
equilibria of the model is available upon request.
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Example1: NBF and Information Asymmetry. We consider two economies which
differ in the degree of information asymmetry between banks and firms but share all
other parameter values with r = 0.10, φ = 1.5, b = 2.1, R = 18, T = 10.
S(n )0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0 2 4 6 8n
T
5 (n)
S(n)
S
Figure 1.  Moderate Information Asymmetry
Case 1: Moderate degree of information asymmetry: N = 10. Figure 1 gives the
resulting NBF equation ψ (n), which is defined in the proof of Proposition 3.2 and the
government security yield equation s (n). The intersection of the two equations gives
the equilibrium at point T at which 61 percent of the firms do not borrow from banks
and the government security rate s settles at 26 percent. In Russia in 1997 more than
50 percent of firms’ sales were financed by other firms in the form of barter transactions
and the treasury bills market rate reached 28 percent (see Figures A1 to A3). Thus, for
reasonable parameter values the model is quite consistent with the data for Russia in
1997.
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160n
5 (n)
Figure 2. High Information Asymmetry
T
S
S(n )
S(n)
Case 2: High degree of information asymmetry: N = 160. Figure 2 gives the
corresponding NBF equation ψ (n) and government security yield equation s (n). At
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the new equilibrium at point T 98 percent of the firms are involved in NBF and the
treasury bill rate reaches 33.4 percent.
The example illustrates that an economy with a higher degree of information
asymmetry suffers from a stronger separation between the real sector and the banking
sector. By contrast, a conventional crowding out story would not depend on the degree
of information asymmetry between banks and firms as is the case here.
IV. Financial Crisis and Banking Development
In the previous section we have derived an equilibrium in which the financial
sector is separated from the real sector and the yields of government securities s are
high. In this section we analyze how an exogenous shock in the agents confidence in
the government which is triggered by the government’s default and the fire sale of
government securities affects an economy with separated financial and real sectors.
A strong negative confidence shock, i.e. an exogenous negative shock in φ
creates a substantial drop in the yields of government securities s.21 As a result, the
banks which are heavily invested in government securities will suffer major losses. The
immediate effect of such a financial crisis on the real sector is, however, limited when
the two sectors are separated.
Corollary 1 With the separation between the banking sector and the real sector, the
plunge of φ has no immediate impact on the number of good quality firms n∗ which do
not borrow from banks, although banks may make losses.
Typically, a financial crisis leads to a sharp fall in GDP followed by a slow and
gradual recovery, as observed in crises in Latin America in the 1980s and in Nordic
countries in the 1990s.22 In an economy in which the financial and the real sectors are
separated, however, a financial crisis may be beneficial for the economy. When φ, thus
s plunge, banks’ options outside of the real sector disappear. This induces banks
to lower lending interest rates to attract more firms. As a result, some good quality
firms switches back to borrowing from banks, and the average quality of borrowers
further improves. The improved quality of the borrowing pool further lowers bank
lending rates, and thus inducing more good-quality firms to borrow. Moreover, when
more good-quality firms borrow, the tax revenue goes up. This reduces government
borrowing, which leads to a further drop in s. This logic leads to a new equilibrium in
21 To make the model simple, we choose to treat the financial crisis as an exogenous event. Our
analysis focuses on the consequences of a financial crisis.
22 See footnote 6.
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which better-quality firms borrow from banks; loan interest rates go down; and banks
invest less in government securities. The ‘separation’ syndrome disappears if the shock
is strong.
Starting from an economy where n∗ good quality firms use NBF, we show now
in the following proposition (proof in Appendix II)that the banking sector gets to
reconnect with the real sector when φ drops.
Proposition 2 If the banking sector is separated from the real sector in an economy,
a financial crisis caused by a plunge of φ may lead to an integration of the two sec-
tors. In the new equilibrium, the ‘separation’ syndrome may diminish or even disappear
associated with a substantial lower lending rate.
Our result is consistent with what has happened in Russia. The financial crisis
in Russia was triggered by the default of the government. Investors lost their confidence
in government securities and the treasury bond market collapsed. Any bank that had
survived this big shock needed to change its portfolio dramatically and started to lend
to the real sector at much lower lending interest rates than before the crisis. Comparing
bank lending to the private sector in 1997, the year before the financial crisis, with that
in 2000, reveals an increase in bank lending in Russia and in Ukraine from 8 percent
and 2 percent of GDP, respectively, to 12 percent and 9 percent of GDP, respectively,
while barter trade declined by about 30 percent.
It is important to point out that although the financial crisis can destroy the bad
equilibrium associated with a banking trap, it only provides the initial conditions for
banking development. This is because severe information asymmetry is the key factor
which causes the separation between the real sector and the banking sector. As long as
information asymmetry between banks and firms is severe, a financial crisis may not be
a sufficient trigger to pull the economy out of a banking trap. Indeed, the following
example illustrates that when the degree of information asymmetry is large enough, the
lemons market problem is so serious that a financial shock is not enough to pull the
economy out of a banking trap.
Example 2: The Impact of Financial Crisis on Banking Development and the
Role of Information Asymmetry. We look at two economies with the same parameter
values as in the previous example (‘calibrated’ to Russian data before the crisis) given
by r = 0.10, b = 2.1, T = 10, R = 18. The initial value of confidence into government
securities is the same, φ = 1.8. The only difference between the two economies is
assumed to be the degree of information asymmetry.
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0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 2 4 6 8n
Figure 3. Moderate Information Asymmetry
5 (n)
T
S
S(n )
S’(n)
S(n)
Case 3: Moderate degree of information asymmetry: N = 10. Figure 3 gives the
ψ (n) curve and the lines s (n) and s0 (n) before and after, respectively the financial
crisis hits the economy. Before the shock (φ = 1.8) the equilibrium settles at point T
at which 74 percent of the firms are involved in NBF with a government security rate
of 34.8 percent. After the shock (a drop in φ to 1.2), in the new equilibrium no firm
engages in NBF and the treasury bill rate is 12 percent.
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160n
Figure 4. High Information Asymmetry
180
S
S( )n 
5 (n)
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S’(n)
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T
T’
Case 4: High degree of information asymmetry: N = 160. Figure 4 gives the
ψ (n) curve with three lines before the shock s (n), after a moderate shock s0 (n) ,
and finally after a drastic shock s00 (n) . Before the shock, the economy settles at an
equilibrium T at which 98.8 percent of the firms engage in NBF and the government
security rate is 40 percent. With the same moderate shock as in Figure 3 (captured
by a drop in φ from 1.8 to 1.2) the new equilibrium at T’ still gives 97.6 percent of
firms involved in NBF and a treasury bill rate of 12.1 percent. Only with a drastic
drop of φ from 1.8 to 0.3 is the NBF economy removed and no firm barter trades with
a government security rate of 3 percent.
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The example illustrates that a small confidence shock in government securities
is sufficient to bring an economy out from the separation between the real sector and
the banking sector if the degree of information asymmetry is moderate. However, a
large shock is required to do the same for an economy with a high degree of information
asymmetry. The example demonstrates how the financial shock interacts with the
degree of information asymmetry and thus highlights the relative importance of each
factor for banking development.
V. Empirical Evidence
A. Firm-Level Evidence
We first examine the predictions of our model on the behavior of firms when
there is a high degree of information asymmetry between firms and banks; and when
there is a high level of government borrowing. Our investigation is based on data of
about 100 firms which engaged in barter trade in Ukraine in 1997. We interviewed 55
firms to obtain information on 165 barter deals. Each firm provided us with 3 barter
deals. Each barter deal involved 2 firms, a seller and a buyer. Many of the firms were
well informed about the financial and economic conditions of the firms they traded with
because they served as financiers. Table 4 and Table 6 give descriptive statistics of the
variables used in the empirical analysis.23
Our model predicts that low quality firms will predominantly finance their
production with bank loans. We examine the relationship between bank lending and
the characteristics of firms in Table 5. In the table we run the regressions for all firms in
the sample (first four columns) and then for firms with positive bank debt only. We use
the firms’ bank debt in percent of sales DEBT as the dependent variable. 62 percent
of the firms have positive bank debt with an average ratio of bank debt to firms sales
of 6.3 percent (see Table 6). As a measure for the firms’ quality λi we use the variable
WAGEARREARS. WAGEARREARS is a proxy for the firms’ quality, since a firm
which stops paying its workers must be in desperate financial and economic conditions.
The more indebted the firm is vis-a-vis its workers the less likely it is that the firm
will be able to repay its bank loans and thus the larger the banks’ credit risk. Thus,
our theory predicts a positive sign on the WAGEARREARS variable. Turning to the
results it appears that WAGEARREARS is significant and positive in all specifications.
23 For a more detailed description of the data sample see Marin, Kaufmann, Gorochowksij (2000).
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0 - 105 0 0 - 10 10 - 105
100% 38% 52% 10%
mean 0.802 0.823 0.800 0.752
Anova:F-test 2.13
sign. level (0.123)
mean 4.55 2.79 4.10 13.53
Anova:F-test 2.02
sign. level (0.136)
mean 3.38 2.01 3.11 9.99
Anova:F-test 12.27
sign. level (0.000)
mean 4679.9 1121.3 7222.5 4981.4
Anova:F-test 1.85
sign. level (0.162)
Source: Data Sample of 165 Barter Deals in Ukraine in 1997
EMPLOY
BARTCOST
bank debt in percent of sales
TOT
WAGEARREARS
Table 4. Bank Lending and Firm Characteristics
Next, we include BARTCOST and TOT as variables capturing the NBF cost b.
BARTCOST is an index which takes the value of zero if the firms output is produced
with only one input and approaches one when the firm uses several inputs from other
sectors. We use BARTCOST here as a measure of the cost of raising liquidity via
barter. When a firm trades in many inputs it will have more leverage in barter trading
between varieties of goods and thus will have lower bartering cost. We expect a negative
coefficient on BARTCOST.24 Turning to the results BARTCOST is negative and
significant suggesting that firms with higher barter costs borrow more from banks.
24 Blanchard and Kremer (1997) use the same variable as a measure for the hold-up problems of firms.
The larger the number of inputs used for production the more complex the production and the more
bargaining problems arise. In their theory of barter Marin and Schnitzer (2003) suggest lower bartering
costs for firms with more complex production. They argue that barter trade helps firms to deal with
the hold-up problem.
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Furthermore, we include the variable TOT into the regression which captures
the terms of trade effect of barter. We will use it here as a measure for the credit costs
of barter. TOT measures in percent the extent to which barter shifts the terms of trade
in favor of the firm extending a trade credit within barter. The larger the shift in the
terms of trade the more costly it is to raise liquidity via barter trade. For given costs
for bank loans an increase in the credit costs of barter induces firms to switch to bank
loans to solve their liquidity needs and thus we expect a positive sign on the TOT
variable. TOT turns out to be positive and highly significant at conventional levels.
Lastly, we introduce the variables STATED and EMPLOY to control for
ownership and firm size. One possible reason why the bad quality firms receive more
bank loans than other firms is that the bad firms may be state owned and/or large. State
owned firms or large firms may have better creditworthiness because of the expectation
of a state bail out. It turns out, however, that neither STATED nor EMPLOY are
significant at conventional levels in the all firms regressions. In the regressions for firms
with positive bank debt (last four columns) STATED is not significant and firm size
appears to hinder the firm to get loans (the relationship is significant and negative).
Standard Number of
Deviation observations
WAGEARREARS 3.4 6 0 38.6 150
BARTCOST 0.80 0.12 0.34 0.92 141
TOT 4.59 18.07 -168.00 50.00 163
EMPLOY 4386.6 17518.1 8 130000 165
BANK DEBT 6.31 15.96 0 104.20 150
STATED
Source: Data Sample of 165 Barter Deals in Ukraine in 1997
Variable
D = 1 , 43 observations
Minimum MaximumMean
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics
B. Cross-Country Evidence
In this section we examine the prediction of the model that a financial crisis may
trigger a change that can substantially improve conditions for banking development.
We will use country level data for 20 transition economies. In these economies financial
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systems in Russia and Ukraine are among the least developed. Our firm level evidence
for Ukraine presented in the previous section suggests a separation between the real
and financial sector that only bad quality firms borrow from banks.
We look for comparative evidence on the determination of bank intermediation
at the macro level across transition countries.25 Our theory predicts that a country’s
level of bank intermediation is driven by the extent of information asymmetry between
banks and firms, by the level of the government budget deficit, and by the level of barter
trade. The government’s budget deficit induces banks to invest their excess liquidity in
government securities which crowds out bank lending to the real sector of the economy.
Barter trade leads banks to charge high interest rates so that they end up lending little
to firms.
We start by examining commercial banks’ lending rates. We expect that
economies with a larger degree of information asymmetry between banks and firms,
with a larger size of government deficit, and with a larger share of barter trade to have
higher commercial banks’ interest rates. We use commercial banks’ 3-months lending
rates as the dependent variable. We measure the degree of information asymmetry
between banks and firms by the country’s EXPORT SHARE and/or by incoming
foreign direct investment as a share of GDP FDI/GDP. Both variables are supposed
to capture the average credit risk of the real sector. The idea is that the larger the
export share and the larger the share of incoming foreign direct investment in percent
of GDP the better the quality of the real sector and thus the lower the interest rates
that banks will charge. Turning to the results in Table 7 this turns out to be the
case, since both variables are negative and significant in the majority of specifications.
The variables GOVDEBT and GOVDEF are both measures for the government’s soft
budget constraint. The former is the government’s debt outstanding and the latter is
the government’s deficit both in percent of GDP. Lending rates will as well be affected
by yields of government securities given the possibility for banks to invest in securities.26
As expected GOVDEBT or GOVDEF have both a positive and significant influence on
interest rates except when the variable FDI/GDP (Stock) is included in the regression.
The variable BARTER measures the share of barter in percent of sales in transition
countries. As predicted the variable tends to increase banks’ lending rates. Finally, we
include the EBRD index of commercial law LEGAL to control for differences in the
25 The empirical results of this section give casual evidence only, since due to the lack of data we were
unable to deal with the problems of endogeneity and multicollinearity adequately.
26 In Russia the government offered exceptionally high yields on government bonds to make it
attractive for banks to invest. In 1996 Russia was among the transition countries with the highest
spread between bank loan and deposit rates. Our model suggests that bank loan rates are driven by
the yields of government securities which may explain why the spread in Russia is particular wide. For
the spreads in the banking sector in transition countries, see Transition Report 1998.
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legal environment across transition countries. Not surprisingly, improvements in the
effectiveness of the legal system tends to lower interest rates.
Next, we investigate how information asymmetry and government borrowing
affects the level of bank intermediation across transition economies. A country’s level of
bank credit to the private sector in percent of GDP is used as the dependent variable.
We want to test whether countries with a higher degree of information asymmetry
between banks and firms, and with more government borrowing have a lower level of
bank intermediation. Table 8 gives the results. As core variables we use the same
variables as before in Table 7 explaining commercial banks’ lending rates. We find
that the variables EXPORT SHARE and FDI/GDP are both positive and significant
at conventional levels suggesting that the lower degree of information asymmetry (the
larger EXPORT SHARE and FDI/GDP), the more banks lend to the private sector.
The variables GOVDEBT and GOVDEF as measures for the size of the government
sector are both not significant (except for one specification) suggesting that the size of
the government budget has no extra effect on the level of bank lending which works
beyond the channel of banks’ lending rates (in Table 7 we found that these variables
tend to increase banks’ lending rates). In specification 4 of Table 8 we include BARTER
(and exclude GOVDEBT and GOVDEF because they tend to be correlated with
BARTER27) and find as predicted that the larger a country’s exposure to the non-cash
economy the lower its level of bank lending to the private sector.
Furthermore, we include the EBRD index for non-banking financial institutions
reform FINREG to control for differences in banking reform across transition countries.
The index goes from 1 to 4, the larger the number, the more reform has been undertaken
in the country. We use the index for non-bank financial institutions as a proxy for
bank reform rather than the index for banking reform itself to avoid problems of
multi-colinearity in the regression. Not surprising, the level of bank intermediation
tends to increase in the countries with more progress in banking reform.
27 Our model predicts that BARTER and GOVDEF will be correlated. The larger the budget deficit
the larger the yields of government bonds and banks interest rates and thus the less attractive it is
for firms to borrow from banks. They switch to barter instead. Furthermore, the more firms barter,
the smaller will be the government’s tax revenues, because firms will tend to exploit the possibility to
evade taxes when bartering.
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We turn to the post financial crisis year of 1999 to see whether the financial
crisis has changed the lending behavior of banks. This is shown in columns (8) to (11)
of Tables 7 and in columns (6) to (10) of Table 8. Four things are noteworthy. First,
the two variables, EXPORT SHARE and FDI/GDP, capturing information asymmetry
between the real sector and the banking sector, stop to have a significant influence on
interest rates (Table 7) as well as on bank lending to the real sector (Table 8). Second,
the effect of GOVDEF and GOVDEBT on lending rates becomes insignificant while
GOVDEF has now in 1999 a marginally significant influence on bank lending to the
private sector. Apparently, the strong reduction in the fiscal budget deficit after the
financial crisis has boosted bank lending to the private sector which has gone beyond
its effect on lending rates. Third, barter stops to have a significant influence on interest
rates as well as on bank lending.
To conclude, the drastic changes in the results of the regressions explaining
interest rates and bank lending behavior before and after the financial crisis suggest
that the financial crisis has changed the behavior of the banking sector in a fundamental
way. The banking sector started to lend to the real sector. This makes it possible for
many transition countries, most notably for Russia and Ukraine, to abandon barter
trade and to return to the cash economy.
VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications
We have developed a model that explains both the onset of the financial crisis
in 1998 and the striking economic recovery afterward in Russia and other former Soviet
Union economies. Before the crisis, the economies of Russia and Ukraine were stuck
in a banking trap in which banks failed to lend to the real sector and firms raised
liquidity through nonbank finance, because of the coexistence of a lemons credit market
and the government’s overissuance of bonds to finance its budget gap. Despite the
financial exuberance on the surface, banking development was seriously hampered and
the economic performance was poor. The collapse of the treasury-bill market triggered
the financial crisis, which brought down many banks and destroyed the surviving banks’
investment opportunities in government securities. As a result, the surviving banks
started to lend to the real sector at low interest rates, which induced more good-quality
firms to use low-cost bank loans rather than costly nonbank finance. A strong economic
recovery followed and provided initial conditions for further banking development.
Our empirical evidence, based on firm-level data and country-level data, supports the
model’s predictions.
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Our model suggests that a financial crisis, though it often causes a credit crunch
and a deep economic recession, may have its benefits as well. One of the benefits
highlighted in this paper is that if an economy is stuck in a banking trap, in which the
financial and real sectors are separated, a crisis may lead it out of the trap and thus
bring about a strong economic recovery. This, in turn, also sets the stage for financial
development by creating favorable initial conditions. It should be emphasized, however,
that whether economic recovery and growth can continue depends critically on whether
banking development can be sustained.
Our model has several policy implications for efforts to sustain further banking
development. A high priority should be placed on fiscal policy. It is critical that
the government harden its budget constraint and avoid creating an environment in
which government bonds crowd out bank loans. The economic recovery has clearly
provided the conditions in which this could happen: since 1999, the government’s fiscal
balance turned into a surplus in Russia as well as in Ukraine. Moreover, reducing the
information asymmetry between banks and their borrowers is another key objective.
Policies aiming at improving corporate governance, accounting and transparency,
and credit risk assessment and management are all necessary. Furthermore, as bank
lending grows, an effective enforcement of loan contacts becomes more important,
as suggested by Perotti (2002). Finally, our results suggest that in order to sustain
banking development, the banks’ returns on loans should be attractive. Thus, at an
early stage of bank development, a moderate amount of competition in the banking
sector is desirable. If bank competition is too strong, however, it will be difficult to
maintain the incentives of banks to lend to the real sector and to invest in evaluating
credit risk.
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APPENDIX I: Figures
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APPENDIX II: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2: Given the quality rank of firms, λ1 > λ2 > ...λn−1 > λn >
... > λN , without loss of generality, let us start with firm n, which is chosen that for
given λ¯N and s; this firm will borrow, but all n− 1 better quality firms do not borrow
in the lending market. However, the n− 1 firms’ withdrawal from the lending market
lowers the average quality of the remaining N − n+ 1 firms
λ¯N−n+1 =
1
N − n+ 1
N−n+1X
i=1
λi
=
(1 +N − n+ 1)µ
2
<
(1 +N)µ
2
= λN .
The lower average quality of the pool of borrowing firms may make firm n decide not
to borrow. Given the quality of firm n
λn = (N − n+ 1)µ,
applying Lemma 1, the general condition for firm n not to borrow is λ¯N−n+1/λn ≤ 1+sb ,
or
(1 +N − n+ 1)µ
2 (N − n+ 1)µ ≤
1 + s
b
.
Rewrite the above condition as the following NBF equation
ψ (n) = b (N − n+ 2)
2 (N − n+ 1) − 1 ≤ s.
Where, in general ψ (n) is defined as
ψ (n) ≡ b λ¯N−n+1
λn
− 1.
It is easy to see that ψ (n) is a convex increasing function of n with ψ (0) = b(N+2)
2(N+1)
− 1
and ψ (N) = b− 1. Thus, if ψ (N) = b − 1 ≤ s, the equilibrium is n∗ = N , i.e. no firm
borrows.
Furthermore, if ψ (0) = b(N+2)
2(N+1)
− 1 ≥ s, by Lemma 1, all firms will borrow and
the equilibrium is n∗ = 0.
Finally, if ψ (0) = b(N+2)
2(N+1)
− 1 < s and ψ (N) = b− 1 > s, there exists n∗ ∈ (0, N)
that ψ (n∗) = s.
Concerning the stability of the equilibrium, it is easy to see that for any firm i,
where i ≤ n∗, ψ (i) < s (i). Thus, firm i will not borrow from banks which will push
more firms to choose not to borrow until i = n∗. Moreover, for any firm j, where j > n∗,
- 33 -
ψ (j) > s (j). Thus, firm j will borrow which pushes more firms to choose to borrow
until j = n∗. Thus, n∗ is a stable equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.2: Notice that s (n) is a linear upward sloping function
with s (0) = φro, and s (N) = φr0RR−Nt . Moreover, ψ (n) is a convex upward sloping
function with ψ (0) = b(N+2)
2(N+1)
− 1, and ψ (N) = b− 1.
If s (0) > ψ (0) and s (N) < ψ (N); or if (b− 1)
¡
1− tN
R
¢
> φro > b(N+2)2(N+1) − 1, a
unique interior equilibrium exists that n∗ ∈ (0, N) and s∗ ∈ (s (0) , s (N)) . Rewriting
s (N) = φr0R
R−Nt < ψ (N) = b − 1 as (b− 1)
¡
1− tN
R
¢
> φro = s (0) and combining with
s (0) > ψ (0) we have the conditions stated in the proposition.
Concerning the stability of the equilibrium (n∗, s∗), it is easy to see that for any
firm i, where i ≤ n∗, ψ (i) < s (i). Thus, firm i will not borrow from banks pushing up
s and leading more firms to choose not to borrow. This makes ψ (i) increase faster than
s (i) until i = n∗. Moreover, for any firm j, where j > n∗, ψ (j) > s (j). Thus, firm j
will borrow pushing down s and leading more firms to choose to borrow. This makes
ψ (i) decrease faster than s (i) until j = n∗. Thus, (n∗, s∗) is a stable equilibrium. Given
that s (n) increases (decreases) with t,φro (R), the comparative static results follow.
Proof of Proposition 4.2: We are going to show two possible cases when φ is
reduced to φ0. Notice that ψ (n) is independent from φ; and further notice that s (n) is
a linear increasing function of φ.
1. If φ0 is reduced moderately a unique stable interior equilibrium nc ∈ (0, n∗) exists
such that nc rms barter trade and the number of bartering rms is reduced. This is
because with a lower φ0 that
φ0ro >
b (N + 2)
2 (N + 1)
− 1.
Applying Lemma 1 we have the result.
2. If φ0 is reduced substantially then in equilibrium nc = 0, i.e. all rms borrow. This is
because with a drastic reduction of φ to φ0 that
φ0ro
R
R− tN <
b (N + 2)
2 (N + 1)
− 1
which implies s (N) < ψ (0) , then in equilibrium nc = 0.
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